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Notes
HOME IS WHERE THE CONFUSION IS: PENNSYLVANIA FORMALLY
ADOPTS THE “GIST OF THE ACTION” DOCTRINE
AND BUILDS A HOUSE FOR AMBIGUITY IN
BRUNO v. ERIE INSURANCE CO.
LAUREN ANTHONY*
“If you can’t convince them, confuse them.”1
I. DRAWING THE FLOOR PLAN: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONTRACT–TORT DISTINCTION AND THE
“GIST OF THE ACTION” DOCTRINE
The contract–tort distinction is fundamental to civil litigation in the
United States.2  While actions for breach of contract compensate the
plaintiff for damages foreseeable at the time of a contract, tort claims rem-
edy injuries resulting from the defendant’s conduct.3  Nonetheless, the
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2014, McGill University.  I would like to thank my family and friends for their
endless support and encouragement.  I would also like to thank the editors of the
Villanova Law Review for their assistance throughout the writing process.  The
inspiration for this title was inspired by Stephen J. Shapiro, Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Formally Adopts “Gist of the Action” Doctrine, JD SUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Jan. 7,
2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/pennsylvania-supreme-court-formally-
adop-26221/ [https://perma.cc/W3X4-WB3N] (explaining that Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had refrained from formally adopting doctrine despite its
consistent application by other Pennsylvania courts and federal courts).
1. Harry S. Truman, Address at the State Fairgrounds, in MIRACLE OF ’48: HARRY
TRUMAN’S MAJOR CAMPAIGN SPEECHES & SELECTED WHISTLE-STOPS 132, 139 (Steve
Neal ed., 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing phrase as political
technique during campaign speech).
2. See Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 978, 982 (Cal. 1999) (“[T]he distinction
between tort and contract is well grounded in common law, and divergent objec-
tives underlie the remedies created in the two areas.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Hunter v. Up–Right, Inc., 864 P.2d 88, 90 (Cal. 1993)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
3. See Kearl v. Rausser, 293 F. App’x 592, 604–05 (10th Cir. 2008) (illustrating
contract–tort distinction regarding damages).
(235)
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contract–tort distinction is often unclear and leaves courts to maintain this
ambiguous legal boundary.4
This blurred boundary is complicated by plaintiffs’ ability to recover
additional forms of damages by bringing actions under tort law rather
than under contract theory.5  Some argue that plaintiffs attempt to dis-
guise breach of contract claims as tort claims to receive a greater damage
award.6  Consequently, courts have imposed barriers for plaintiffs who as-
sert tort claims against parties with whom they are in privity of contract.7
4. See Charles Miller, Comment, Contortions over Contorts: A Distinct Damages
Requirement?, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1257, 1257–58 (1997) (discussing difficulty
within judiciary in drawing distinction between tort and contract law); see also
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 98 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed.
1995) (acknowledging merger of contract and tort law).  Courts around the coun-
try have also addressed the preservation of the contract–tort distinction. See, e.g.,
CMFG Life Ins. Co. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, No. 14–cv–249–wmc, 2015
WL 4647000, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 5, 2015) (discussing attempt by judiciary to
preserve contract–tort demarcation); see also E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1986) (discussing need to preserve distinction
between actions for breach of warranty and those in products liability context);
Iron Mountain Sec. Storage Corp. v. Am. Specialty Foods, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1158,
1165 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (stating Pennsylvania courts have sought to maintain con-
tract–tort division).
5. See William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J.
629, 630 (1999) (“Traditionally, punitive damages have not been available for
breach of contract.  The goal of contract remedies has been to compensate the
promisee for the breach rather than to compel the promisor to perform.”).  While
punitive damages are generally unavailable in actions for breach of contract, they
may be available to plaintiffs who seek recovery in tort. See Danielle Sawaya, Note,
Not Just for Products Liability: Applying the Economic Loss Rule Beyond Its Origins, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 1073, 1083 (2014) (discussing greater opportunity for increased
damages in tort claims as compared to actions for breach of contract); see also
Erlich, 981 P.2d at 982 (explaining general objectives of contract and tort dam-
ages).  Although contract damages reflect the intent of the parties in regard to
their contractual agreement, tort damages may involve elements of social policy.
See id. (“Whereas contract actions are created to enforce the intentions of the par-
ties to the agreement, tort law is primarily designed to vindicate ‘social policy.’”
(quoting Hunter, 864 P.2d at 90) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
6. See generally Amy G. Doehring, Blurring the Distinction Between Contract and
Tort: Courts Permitting Business Plaintiffs to Recover Tort Damages for Breach of Contract,
ABA BUS. TORTS J., Winter 2005, at 1, 1 (discussing potential for parties to seek tort
damages for actions arising from breach of contract); Lisa T. Munyon, Alice L.
Blackwell & Paul Sarlo, Tort and Contract Actions: Strange Bedfellows No More in the
Wake of Tiara Condominium, 87 FLA. B.J. 41 (2013) (indicating that “talented law-
yers” may use “intelligent pleading” to bring tort claims alongside contract actions
despite barriers from courts).
7. See, e.g., Reardon v. Allegheny Coll., 926 A.2d 477, 485–86 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2007) (stating that gist of action doctrine seeks to prevent “problematic” event
when plaintiffs recover in both contract and tort); see also Glazer v. Chandler, 200
A.2d 416, 418 (Pa. 1964) (discussing caution among courts in permitting tort re-
covery when contracts exist between parties).  There is noticeable reluctance
among Pennsylvania courts to limit recovery in tort when a contract exists between
the parties. See e.g., Oak St. Printery, LLC v. Fujifilm N. Am. Corp., 895 F. Supp. 2d
613, 643 n.25 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (“Under Pennsylvania law, courts have been reluc-
tant to allow tort recovery for what is essentially a breach of contract action.” (quot-
2
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One such barrier is the “gist of the action” doctrine, a longstanding
fixture in Pennsylvania common law that precludes a plaintiff from suing
in tort when the “gist” of the plaintiff’s action is ultimately contractual.8
The doctrine aims to prevent plaintiffs from reasserting a breach of con-
tract claim under the guise of a tort action.9  This doctrine has evolved
into a standard defense and allows defendants to move for dismissal of a
tort claim that is, in actuality, one for breach of contract.10
ing C.P. Cook Coal Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., No. 93-CV-7085, 1995 WL 251341,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1995))); Sun Co. v. Badger Design & Constructors, Inc.,
939 F. Supp. 365, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“In general, Pennsylvania courts have been
reluctant to permit tort recovery for contractual breaches.” (quoting Wood &
Locker, Inc. v. Doran & Assocs., 708 F. Supp. 684, 689 (W.D. Pa. 1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
8. See eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Adver. Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 15 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002) (“‘Gist’ is a term of art in common law pleading that refers to ‘the essential
ground or object of the action in point of law, without which there would be no
cause of action.’” (quoting Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Fojanini, 90 F. Supp. 2d
615, 622–23 (E.D. Pa. 2000))).  In eToll, the court ruled that the plaintiff’s fraud
claim was barred under the doctrine, as the “gist” of the claim was contractual. See
id. at 21 (“The fraud at issue was not so tangential to the parties’ relationship so as
to make fraud the gist of the action.”).  The gist of the action doctrine seeks to
preclude plaintiffs from bringing tort claims if the “gist” or gravamen of the com-
plaint is actually contract-based. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Eaton Metal
Prods. Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 329, 339 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing Bash v. Bell Tel. Co.,
601 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)) (stating purpose of doctrine is to prevent
assertion of breach of contract claims under pretense of tort claims).
The gist of the action doctrine differs from the “economic loss” doctrine,
which prevents recovery for financial loss in products liability scenarios. See JAMES
J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-5, at 385 (Horn-
book Ser. 4th ed. 1995) (“In some states this common law doctrine has achieved
the status of the ‘economic loss doctrine[,]’[ ] meaning that once loss is defined as
‘economic’ it cannot be recovered at least in negligence or strict tort and perhaps
not in fraud or misrepresentation.”); see also Economic-Loss Rule, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining economic-loss rule as “[t]he principle that a plain-
tiff generally cannot recover for financial harm that results from injury to the
person or property of another”).  Unlike the economic-loss rule, the gist of the
action doctrine typically applies in non-products liability litigation. See
Bohler–Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 104 n.11 (3d Cir.
2001) (“The ‘gist-of-the-action’ test is a better fit for this non-products liability
case.”); Wilmington Fin., Inc. v. Am. One Fin. Inc., No. 06-5559, 2007 WL 2221424,
at *2 n.1 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2007) (stating that gist of action doctrine is more appro-
priate than economic loss doctrine in non-products liability actions).
9. See Hart v. Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (describing
purpose of gist of action doctrine as precluding plaintiffs from “re-casting ordinary
breach of contract claims into tort claims” and acknowledging relationship be-
tween purpose of gist of action doctrine and goal of maintaining conceptual con-
tract–tort boundary); Pratter v. Penn Treaty Am. Corp., 11 A.3d 550, 558 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2010) (stating that doctrine’s purpose is to prevent tort claims when
“essence” sounds in contract, not tort (quoting Sullivan v. Chartwell Inv. Partners,
LP, 873 A.2d 710, 718 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005))).
10. See Corey J. Adamson, Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review the “Gist of the
Action” Doctrine., THOMAS, THOMAS & HAFER, http://www.tthlaw.com/index.php?id
=492 [https://perma.cc/5LCE-ZTXP] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (describing sig-
nificance of gist of action doctrine as defense in pleading stage of litigation); Max-
well S. Kennerly, In Pennsylvania, “Gist of the Action” Precludes Identical Breach of
3
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Both lower Pennsylvania courts and federal courts have consistently
invoked the doctrine to evaluate tort claims.11  The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court issued multiple opinions related to this doctrine throughout the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.12  However, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court did not formally adopt the gist of the action doc-
trine until 2014.13
Contract and Negligence Claims, Not Simultaneous Contract and Tort Claims, LITIG. &
TRIAL (July 29, 2008), http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2008/07/articles/the-
law/for-lawyers/in-pennsylvania-gist-of-the-action-precludes-identical-breach-of-
contract-and-negligence-claims-not-simultaneous-contract-and-tort-claims/
[https://perma.cc/5QRR-ALHR] (updated Sept. 21, 2013) (describing frequent
use of gist of action doctrine by defendants).  Defendants typically invoke the gist
of the action doctrine to support a motion to dismiss certain tort claims asserted
against them. See, e.g., Vogelsberger v. Magee-Women’s Hosp., 75 Pa. D. & C.4th
490, 503–04 (C.P. Allegheny 2005) (describing role of doctrine in determining
whether certain claims prevail over defendant’s motion to dismiss).  Defendants
also rely on the gist of the action doctrine frequently in support of preliminary
objections. See, e.g., Defendant Gibbs Connors’ Brief in Support of Preliminary
Objections at 2–5, Hanson Gen. Contracting, Inc. v. Connors, No. 130703272,
2013 WL 10449749, at *2–5 (C.P. Phila. Sept. 27, 2013) (stating preliminary objec-
tion should be granted and plaintiff’s fraud claim should be dismissed pursuant to
gist of action doctrine); Defendant AEC Grp., Inc.’s Brief in Support of Prelimi-
nary Objections to Complaint at 5–7, Sima Prods. Corp. v. AEC Grp., Inc., No.
G.D. 06-1485, 2006 WL 1502277, at *5–7 (C.P. Allegheny Apr. 4, 2006) (arguing
that plaintiff’s conversion and negligence claims are contract-based and thus
barred under doctrine).
11. See Hart, 884 A.2d at 339 (discussing Pennsylvania Superior Court’s consis-
tent application of gist of the action doctrine as means of preventing tort recovery
in certain instances).  The gist of the action doctrine also appears frequently at the
district court level in Pennsylvania. See Diodato v. Wells Fargo Ins. Servs., USA,
Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 541, 554 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (holding that plaintiff’s claim for
fraudulent inducement was barred by doctrine because claim was based in con-
tract); Tender Touch Rehab Servs., LLC v. Brighten at Bryn Mawr, 26 F. Supp. 3d
376, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding that claim for civil conspiracy was not barred by
doctrine because alleged tortious conduct was not based in parties’ contract).  The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also acknowledged the
gist of the action doctrine. See Addie v. Kjaer, 737 F.3d 854, 863 (3d Cir. 2013)
(providing overview of doctrine’s application within Third Circuit); Air Products &
Chems., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d at 340 (noting application of doctrine by district
courts within Third Circuit).
12. See generally, e.g., Horney v. Nixon, 61 A. 1088, 1089 (Pa. 1905) (drawing
distinction between instances when gist of action is breach of duty and when gist of
action is breach of contract); Zell v. Arnold, 2 Pen. & W. 292, 294 (Pa. 1830) (in-
troducing concept of “gist” of plaintiff’s action and drawing contract-tort distinc-
tion).  While these decisions do not reflect a formal application of the gist of the
action doctrine, they demonstrate the beginnings of Pennsylvania’s tradition of
barring tort claims with contractual bases. See Horney, 61 A. at 1090 (holding that
“only [available] remedy [is] assumpsit for [ ] breach of [ ] contract”).
13. See Stephen J. Shapiro, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Formally Adopts “Gist of
the Action” Doctrine, JD SUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.jdsupra
.com/legalnews/pennsylvania-supreme-court-formally-adop-26221/ [https://per
ma.cc/W3X4-WB3N] (explaining that Pennsylvania Supreme Court had refrained
from formally adopting doctrine despite its consistent application by other Penn-
sylvania courts and federal courts).
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In Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., the court adopted the gist of the action
doctrine and concluded that the plaintiffs’ negligence claims were not
barred under this principle.14  Addressing the superior court’s approach,
the court held that the Brunos could proceed with their tort claim because
they alleged the breach of a general social duty, rather than a contractual
obligation.15
This Note asserts that in Bruno, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
missed a key opportunity to clarify the gist of the action doctrine.16  In-
stead, the court put forth a questionable application of the doctrine,
which failed to explain the analysis for determining the presence of a “so-
cial duty” and did not specify a category of defendants to which its holding
potentially applies.17  Additionally, this Note addresses the Bruno opin-
ion’s lack of interpretive guidance for lower courts applying the doctrine
and the impact this ambiguity may have on future litigation.18
Part II of this Note details the history of the gist of the action doctrine
in Pennsylvania and the legal landscape leading up to Bruno.19  Part III
describes the facts, procedural history, and analysis behind the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Bruno.20  Part IV then critiques the
court’s analysis and examines the impact of the majority’s holding on fu-
ture litigation.21  Part V concludes by recommending a judicial strategy for
lower courts seeking to interpret Bruno’s ambiguous holding.22
14. See Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48, 69 (Pa. 2014) (explicitly acknowl-
edging support for duty-based approach to doctrine).
15. See id. at 68 (“The general governing principle which can be derived from
our prior cases is that our Court has consistently regarded the nature of the duty
alleged to have been breached . . . to be the critical determinative factor in deter-
mining whether the claim is truly one in tort, or for breach of contract.”); cf. Bash
v. Bell Tel. Co., 601 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating tort claims are
permissible under doctrine if they are extra-contractual and arise from breach of
socially imposed duty), superseded by PA. R. APP. P. 341, as stated in Keefer v. Keefer,
741 A.2d 808 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
16. For a critique of the reasoning in Bruno, see infra notes 101–32 and ac-
companying text.
17. For a further discussion of issues within the Bruno court’s analysis, see
infra notes 108–32 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the problematic nature and impact of the hold-
ing of Bruno, see infra notes 133–39 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the gist of the action doctrine leading up to
Bruno, see infra notes 23–50 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the factual background, procedural history,
and reasoning in Bruno, see infra notes 51–100 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of problems within the court’s analysis of the gist
of the action doctrine in Bruno, see infra notes 101–32 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of potential recommendations for lower courts
following Bruno, see infra notes 133–39 and accompanying text.
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II. LAYING THE FOUNDATION: THE GIST OF THE ACTION DOCTRINE
IN PENNSYLVANIA BEFORE BRUNO
The gist of the action doctrine is relatively unique to Pennsylvania
law.23  Prior to Bruno, two primary frameworks emerged from the lower
courts for interpreting the gist of the action doctrine.24  Despite this doc-
trine’s prominence and frequent usage by both the superior court and
federal courts in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court lacked an
official position on the gist of the action doctrine until Bruno.25
A. Working from the Ground Up: The History of the Gist of the Action
Doctrine in Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania’s history regarding the gist of the action doctrine traces
back to Zell v. Arnold.26  In Zell, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court con-
cluded the gist of a plaintiff’s action was the “nature of the duty
breached.”27  The court expanded on this duty inquiry and distinguished
23. The doctrine has, however, appeared in a recent analysis by the Fourth
Circuit. See, e.g., Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Crystal Ridge Dev., Inc., 783 F.3d 976,
980 (4th Cir. 2015) (stating that application of doctrine under West Virginia law
requires duty-based analysis).  Other instances in which the doctrine appears
outside Pennsylvania generally involve other state courts applying Pennsylvania
law. See, e.g., Khan v. Shamrock Partners, Ltd., 292 F. App’x 604, 605–06 (9th Cir.
2008) (applying Pennsylvania case law on doctrine due to Pennsylvania-based de-
fendant); Freay v. IM Wilson, Inc., No. 07-cv-269(DMC), 2007 WL 2300721, at *2
(D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2007) (“Pennsylvania recognizes the ‘gist of the action doctrine’
and New Jersey does not.”).  Discussion of the doctrine at the state-court level
outside Pennsylvania is limited. See, e.g., FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. Advanta Corp.,
No. Civ.A.16912-NC, 2003 WL 240885, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2003) (declining to
apply doctrine to plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim); Gaddy Eng’g Co.
v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, LLP, 746 S.E.2d 568, 577 (W. Va. 2013)
(barring plaintiff’s fraud claims on basis that they were intertwined with contract
yet not explicitly applying the doctrine).
24. For a further discussion of the interpretive frameworks developed in the
lower courts before Bruno, see infra notes 34–50 and accompanying text.
25. See Laura A. Wagner, Note, The Economic Loss Doctrine: A Recommendation for
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 825, 829 (2011) (describing
lack of guidance for lower Pennsylvania courts for applying the doctrine).  Other
courts expressly noted the lack of formal approval of the doctrine by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court. See, e.g., Vives v. Rodriguez, 849 F. Supp. 2d 507, 516
(E.D. Pa. 2012) (noting Pennsylvania Supreme Court had yet to adopt doctrine
despite Third Circuit and Pennsylvania Superior Court’s prediction that it would
do so).
26. 2 Pen. & W. 292, 295 (Pa. 1830).
27. See Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48, 63 (Pa. 2014) (stating “Zell estab-
lished that the nature of the duty breached . . . is determinative of the gist of the
action . . . .”). Zell laid the foundation for Pennsylvania’s duty-based application of
the doctrine. See Zell, 2 Pen. & W. at 295 (“In all cases where the action is not on
the contract, but for the breach of a collateral duty, the gist is a personal tort . . . .”).
Moreover, Zell articulated a distinction between an action against a defendant for
failing to perform a contractual obligation and one stemming from a defendant’s
negligent performance of the obligation; while the former gives rise to an action
for breach of contract, the latter allows for an independent tort claim. See id. at
6
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between breaches of contractual duties and breaches amounting to tor-
tious conduct in McCahan v. Hirst.28  Under this early analysis, a plaintiff
could be barred from asserting a tort claim if the claim alleged the breach
of a duty imposed by the terms of the parties’ contract.29
Through the second half of the nineteenth century, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court continued to analyze the duty breached, applying the doc-
trine both explicitly and implicitly.30  By seeking to determine whether the
duty originated from the parties’ contract, the court developed a duty-
based inquiry for applying the gist of the action doctrine.31  While the
court subsequently continued drawing contract–tort distinctions when
294 (“The gist of an action on the case like the present, is not a failure to perform,
but a failure to perform in a workmanly manner, which is a tort.”).
28. 7 Watts 175, 179 (Pa. 1838) (defining nonfeasance as non-performance of
contractual duty and misfeasance as negligent performance of such duty).
29. See id. at 178 (finding plaintiff’s claim was ultimately contractual because
it derived from obligation set forth in parties’ contract).  While the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court did not explicitly address the gist of the action doctrine in McCa-
han, language in the opinion indicates an early formulation of the concept. See id.
(“Contract then being the foundation of the duty imposed upon the defendant, by
his having become bailee, it is clear that a breach of the duty thereby imposed,
which is the real cause of action here, must be regarded as arising out of
contract . . . .”).
30. See Cook v. Haggerty, 2 Grant 257, 258 (Pa. 1858) (evaluating plaintiff’s
claim as one for breach of contract rather than tort because duty breached was
deemed contractual in nature).  While Cook did not explicitly invoke the gist of the
action doctrine, its analysis of the plaintiff’s claim foreshadowed Pennsylvania’s
modern application of the doctrine. See id. (“That proper care is averred to have
been the duty of the defendant under the contract, does not necessarily make the
declaration sound in tort.”); see also Bruno, 106 A.3d at 64 (referencing Cook to
demonstrate court’s previous examination of relevant duty in analyzing plaintiffs’
claims).  Furthermore, the supreme court continued to invoke this analysis later in
the nineteenth century. See Krum v. Anthony, 8 A. 598, 600 (Pa. 1887) (character-
izing plaintiff’s claim as one sounding in tort because gist of action was allegation
of negligence). McCahan added to the distinction originally set forth in Zell by
clarifying that a misfeasance, or legal wrong, is not contract-based. See McCahan, 7
Watts at 179 (“But a misfeasance is a trespass or wrong committed, which, in contem-
plation of law has no relation to a contract in any case.”).  However, while McCahan
included an early application of a duty-based inquiry, it is important to note that
the court made this analysis for jurisdictional purposes. See id. (examining duty
allegedly breached for purposes of deciding whether jurisdiction existed over de-
fendant in cause of action for breach of bailment).
31. See Horney v. Nixon, 61 A. 1088, 1089 (Pa. 1905) (“When the gist of the
action is a breach of duty and not of contract, and the contract is not alleged as the
cause of action . . . the rules applying to actions ex delicto determine the rights of
the parties.” (quoting Frink v. Potter, 17 Ill. 405, 412 (1856)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).  Actions ex delicto are those that arise from a tort or legal wrong,
but are not based in contract. See Ex Delicto, CORNELL U.L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ex_delicto [https://perma.cc/Q6FC-V2Q5]
(last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (defining ex delicto).  In Nixon, the plaintiff had pur-
chased tickets from defendant, the owner of a theater, and the court acknowl-
edged the possibility that one may bring an action in tort despite being in privity of
contract with the defendant. See Nixon, 61 A. at 1089 (stating tort remedy is availa-
ble if defendant acted negligently in carrying out contractual duties).
7
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evaluating duties owed to plaintiffs, Pennsylvania justices refrained from
formally adopting the doctrine.32  Despite the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s continued silence on the issue, the state’s lower and federal courts
consistently applied the doctrine and two approaches emerged.33
B. Putting up the Walls: The Emergence of the Duty-Based Analysis and
Additional “Inextricably Intertwined” Inquiry
Within the Superior Court
Prior to Bruno, a consistent analysis for applying the gist of the action
doctrine emerged within superior court opinions.34  The superior court
examined whether the relevant duty stemmed from a contractual or social
duty and subsequently, whether the contract and tort claims were “inextri-
cably intertwined.”35
1. The First Floor: The Superior Court’s Interpretation of the Gist of the Action
Doctrine Begins with Bash
The superior court generated a dual-layered approach for applying
the gist of the action doctrine during the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury.36  In the 1992 decision Bash v. Bell Telephone Co.,37 the superior court
distinguished between tort actions and breach of contract actions on the
basis of their respective duties, stating that tort actions stem from duties
32. See Bruno, 106 A.3d at 56 (acknowledging plaintiff’s argument that Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has applied doctrine despite not having formally adopting
it).  The court permitted actions in tort—despite any presence of a contractual
duty—if it found the defendant had a broader, socially imposed duty. See, e.g.,
Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 243 A.2d 395, 398 (Pa. 1968) (holding landlord had social
duty to tenant that fell outside lease agreement and subsequently allowing for tort
action); Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 168 A.2d 573, 575 (Pa. 1961) (stating defen-
dant’s contractual obligations may allow courts to find broader duty that extends
beyond privity of contract).
33. See, e.g., Bash v. Bell Tel. Co., 601 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(citing Iron Mountain Sec. Storage Corp. v. Am. Specialty Foods, Inc., 457 F. Supp.
1158 (E.D. Pa. 1978)) (stating tort actions correspond to duties imposed as matters
of social policy while actions for breach of contract correspond to duties imposed
by parties’ contractual agreements), superseded by PA. R. APP. P. 341, as stated in
Keefer v. Keefer, 741 A.2d 808 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). But see eToll, Inc. v. Elias/
Savion Adver. Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (focusing gist of action
inquiry on whether tort claim is too closely connected with parties’ contract in-
stead of the existence of social duty).  For a further discussion of the prevalence of
these two inquiries among the lower courts in Pennsylvania leading up to Bruno,
see infra notes 34–50 and accompanying text.
34. See Bash, 601 A.2d at 829 (differentiating between contract and tort du-
ties). But see eToll, 811 A.2d at 18 (examining nexus between tort claim and
contract).
35. For a further discussion of the influence of Bash and eToll in Bruno, see
infra notes 69–96 and accompanying text.
36. See Bruno, 106 A.3d at 66 (acknowledging role of superior court in devel-
oping jurisprudence on doctrine).
37. 601 A.2d 825 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), superseded by PA. R. APP. P. 341, as
stated in Keefer v. Keefer, 741 A.2d 808 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
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“imposed by law as a matter of social policy,” while contract actions relate
to “mutual consensus agreements between particular individuals  . . . .”38
In Bash, the court held that the plaintiff’s claim against a telephone com-
pany that agreed to provide advertising services in a phonebook was
barred under the doctrine because the parties’ obligations were “a matter
of private contract law.”39  The court distinguished the parties’ relation-
ship from one in which a party provides the other with a public utility,
where its duties stem from “the larger social policies embodied in the law
of torts.”40  Following Bash, lower Pennsylvania courts generally applied
the Bash court’s duty-based analysis of the doctrine; a plaintiff’s tort claim
was barred under the doctrine if the defendant’s alleged breach stemmed
from a duty that was ultimately based in the parties’ contract.41  This duty-
based view, as articulated in Bash, became the governing framework for
the gist of the action doctrine until 2002.42
38. See id. at 829 (alteration in original) (quoting Iron Mountain Sec. Storage
Corp. v. Am. Specialty Foods, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).  Rich-
ard Bash entered a contractual agreement with the defendant whereby the defen-
dant would publish advertisements on his behalf through a yellow pages directory.
See id. at 826.  When the defendant failed to do so, Bash filed suit, seeking damages
for breach of contract, negligence, and violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
See id. (describing procedural history of case).  The court held that Bash was pre-
cluded from bringing his fraud claim because it was fundamentally contractual.
See id. at 832.
39. See id. at 829 (examining nature of parties’ obligations under contract
between plaintiff and defendant).
40. See id. at 830 (“[I]n this case, the parties’ obligations are defined by the
terms of the contract, and not by the larger social policies embodied in the law of
torts.”); see also id. at 829 (“Although certain services, such as alphabetical directory
listings, are considered by the courts to be a public service, and thus governed by
Public Utility regulations, contracts for the purchase of supplemental advertise-
ment listings are considered to be a private contractual matter.” (citing Felix v. Pa.
Pub. Util. Comm’n, 146 A.2d 347, 350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959))).
41. See, e.g., Phico Ins. Co. v. Presbyterian Med. Servs. Corp., 663 A.2d 753,
757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (citing Bash for proposition that contract–tort distinction
rests on source of duty allegedly breached).  Prior to eToll, Bash was the prevailing
guidance for Pennsylvania trial courts that applied the gist of the action doctrine.
See, e.g., White Oak Builders, Inc. v. E. Penn Mortg. Co. LLC, 7 Pa. D. & C.5th 215,
219–20 (C.P. Monroe 2009) (citing Bash and holding plaintiff’s tort claim was
barred under doctrine because it arose out of home construction contract between
parties); Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Archdiocese of Phila., Nos. 2219, 081210, 2001 WL
1807938, at *2–4 (C.P. Phila. Oct. 24, 2001) (stating superior court has followed
Bash in applying gist of action doctrine while deciding defendant’s counterclaim
for negligence was barred under doctrine because it stemmed only from contrac-
tual duty); Chenot v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 47 Pa. D. & C.4th 332, 335–36 (C.P.
Butler 2000) (permitting tort claims under Bash because plaintiff did not seek rem-
edy stemming from breach of parties’ contract); Acad. Insulation Co. v. Bell Tel.
Co., 24 Phila. 515, 517–18 (C.P. 1992) (stating plaintiff’s tort claim was barred
under Bash because parties’ duties stemmed from their contractual relationship
and not from social duties).
42. See Pittsburgh Constr. Co. v. Griffith, 834 A.2d 572, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003) (referencing Bash to explain tendency among courts to preclude recovery
where tort claim may be “re-casting” of breach of contract claim).
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2. The Second Story: eToll Sets Forth Additional “Inextricably Intertwined”
Inquiry
The Pennsylvania Superior Court constructed an additional analytical
framework in 2002 with eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advertising, Inc.43  The
court examined whether the gist of the action doctrine barred the plaintiff
from asserting a fraud claim against an advertising company with whom
the plaintiff contracted for marketing services.44  Applying the gist of the
action doctrine, the court added a layer to the Bash analysis by determin-
ing whether the duties giving rise to the fraud claim were so “inextricably
intertwined” with the defendant’s contractual duties as to be barred by the
doctrine.45  The court stated that the doctrine precludes tort claims in
four scenarios: (1) when the duty breached arises from the parties’ con-
tract; (2) when the duties were “created and grounded in the contract
itself”; (3) when liability results from the contract; or (4) when the tort
claim is considered to be a duplicate or recasting of a breach of contract
claim.46 EToll thus provided an additional layer of scrutiny within the
lower Pennsylvania courts, causing courts not only to examine the nature
of the alleged duty, but also the proximity of the duty to the parties’
contract.47
43. 811 A.2d 10, 19–21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (discussing court’s reasoning
while introducing “inextricably intertwined” language).
44. See id. at 12–13 (explaining facts and procedural history).  In eToll, the
plaintiff, eToll, was a software development company that hired the defendant to
advertise its product. See id.  The plaintiff brought suit against the advertising com-
pany for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and professional negligence, claiming
that it falsely represented itself as capable of promoting the software. See id.
45. See id. at 14 (citing Bash for proposition that viability of tort claim between
parties in contractual privity rests on whether tort claim is gist of action). EToll
expanded on the Bash analysis of the gist of the action doctrine by adding a focus
on whether the tort claim and contract are “inextricably intertwined.” See id. at 21
(“The fraud at issue was not so tangential to the parties’ relationship so as to make
fraud the gist of the action.  Rather, we conclude that the fraud claims are inextrica-
bly intertwined with the contract claims.” (emphasis added)).
46. See id. at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating existing case law
appears to be concerned with whether fraud alleged took place in performance of
duties set forth by the contract).
47. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Construction, 834 A.2d at 583–84 (applying “inextricably
intertwined” standard to conversion claim and holding claim was barred because
its validity rested on substance of parties’ contract).  The Pennsylvania Superior
Court largely applied the “inextricably intertwined” standard after eToll. See, e.g.,
Hart v. Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding plaintiff’s claims
for fraud in performance of contract were barred under gist of action doctrine
because alleged duties were grounded entirely in parties’ contractual agreement).
Additionally, eToll influenced the application of the gist of the action doctrine
within the Pennsylvania courts of common pleas. See, e.g., Price v. Freeze & Frizz
Inc., 11 Pa. D. & C.5th 486, 494 (C.P. Lancaster 2009) (“In this instance, Plaintiff’s
fraud claim is collateral to, and not intertwined with, the performance obligations
created by a particular term of the Agreement.”); White v. George, 66 Pa. D. &
C.4th 129, 160 (C.P. Mercer 2004) (permitting tort claims based on finding that
they are not impermissibly intertwined with contract).
10
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Despite the addition of eToll, lower courts applied both gist of the
action frameworks inconsistently.48  Consequently, there was a clear lack
of consensus regarding the applicable standard for evaluating tort claims
under the doctrine prior to Bruno.49 Bruno was the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s first significant opportunity following eToll to adopt the gist of the
action doctrine formally and articulate a clear standard for its
application.50
III. FINISHING TOUCHES?: PENNSYLVANIA SELECTS A DUTY-BASED
APPROACH BUT LEAVES THE DOOR OPEN FOR
AMBIGUITY IN BRUNO
In Bruno, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was tasked with resolving
the longstanding ambiguity surrounding the gist of the action doctrine.51
With over one hundred years since the court’s last explicit examination of
the doctrine, Bruno highlighted the divergent case law that emerged in the
wake of Bash and eToll.52  By holding the plaintiffs’ negligence claim was
not barred by the doctrine because the defendant owed the plaintiffs a
duty as a matter of social policy and not as a result of the parties’ contract,
48. See Mirzio v. Joseph, 4 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (finding
duty-based framework more persuasive than inquiry as to whether tort claims are
impermissible intertwined with contract); Reed v. Dupuis, 920 A.2d 861, 867 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2007) (permitting plaintiff’s tort claim against landlord on basis of land-
lord’s duties to tenant as matter of social policy); Sullivan v. Chartwell Inv. Part-
ners, LP, 873 A.2d 710, 718–19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (examining nexus between
plaintiff’s tort claims and parties’ contractual agreement).
49. See Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48, 67 (Pa. 2014) (“Subsequent deci-
sions of the Superior Court assessing whether a particular tort claim between con-
tracting parties is barred by the gist of the action doctrine have taken varied
approaches.”).
50. See Daniel E. Cummins, Gist of the Action Doctrine Accepted for Review by Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, TORT TALK (Sept. 19, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.torttalk
.com/2013/09/gist-of-action-doctrine-accepted-for.html [https://perma.cc/3TR3-
XQTH] (acknowledging Bruno as opportunity for state supreme court to review
doctrine); Kenneth J. Hardin, II, Changes to the Gist of the Action Doctrine in Penn-
sylvania, HARDIN THOMPSON PC (July 2, 2015), http://www.hardinlawpc.com/
blog/2015/07/changes-to-the-gist-of-the-action-doctrine-in-pennsylvania.shtml
[https://perma.cc/94RL-FLS5] (describing consistent use of doctrine as well as
lack of formal acknowledgment within Pennsylvania courts).
51. See Fineman Krekstein Harris P.C., Pennsylvania Supreme Court Issues Opin-
ion on Gist of the Action Doctrine, MARTINDALE (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.martindale
.com/litigation-law/article_Fineman-Krekstein-Harris-PC_2194232.htm [https://
perma.cc/N6HN-V52F] (stating that Bruno court “affirmed the existence” of doc-
trine and noting previous application of doctrine in lower courts). See generally
Wagner, supra note 25, at 829 (describing ambiguity within Pennsylvania regarding
gist of the action doctrine).
52. See Bruno, 106 A.3d at 64 (providing overview of court’s precedent dealing
with gist of the action doctrine and acknowledging court has had limited opportu-
nities for examining doctrine); id. at 66 (“As the parties have discussed in their
briefs, the Superior Court has fully embraced the gist of the action doctrine as a
means of determining whether a putative tort claim is barred because its substance
is, in actuality, a claim for breach of contract.”).
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the court adopted an interpretation of the doctrine closer to that seen in
Bash, as opposed to that in eToll.53  While the court’s decision to invoke a
duty-based standard was an attempt to establish a uniform interpretation
of the doctrine under Pennsylvania law, its broad holding allows for con-
tinued ambiguity surrounding the application of the doctrine and may
ultimately increase the number of tort claims brought by plaintiffs who
now can rely on the opinion’s broad language.54  While the majority in-
voked a broad interpretation of a social duty, Justice Eakin’s concurrence
addressed the breadth of the majority’s holding and the problematic na-
ture of its interpretation of the gist of the action doctrine.55
A. Facts and Procedural History
David and Angela Bruno began renovations on their Pennsylvania
home in 2007 and discovered black mold growing within the basement
walls.56  Mr. and Mrs. Bruno notified their homeowners’ insurance carrier,
Erie Insurance Company, of the mold’s presence.57  Erie ultimately de-
cided the mold was harmless and advised Mr. Bruno to proceed with his
renovations.58  In 2008, Mrs. Bruno’s health began to deteriorate, which
53. See id. at 71 (reversing order of superior court and holding plaintiffs’
claim not barred by doctrine). Compare id. (“The policy in this instance merely
served as the vehicle which established the relationship between the Brunos and
Erie, during the existence of which Erie allegedly committed a tort.”), with Bash v.
Bell Tel. Co., 601 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating existence of contract
between parties does not preclude possibility of actionable tort), superseded by PA.
R. APP. P. 341, as stated in Keefer v. Keefer, 741 A.2d 808 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). But
see eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Adver. Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
(stating focus of gist of action inquiry is whether tort concerned performance of
duties under contract).
54. See Bruno, 106 A.3d at 76 (Eakin, J., concurring) (criticizing reach of ma-
jority opinion); see also Marshall J. Walthew, Sara B. Richman & John L. Schweder,
II, Gist of the Action Doctrine May Not Bar Tort Claims Arising from Negligent Performance
of Contractual Duties, COM. LITIG. ALERT (Pepper Hamilton LLP, Phila., Pa.), Jan. 6,
2015, at 2, available at http://www.pepperlaw.com/resource/2092/24C0 [https://
perma.cc/Q8YY-7562] (“Future cases will test the breadth of the Bruno ruling.”).
55. See Bruno, 106 A.3d at 75 (Eakin, J., concurring) (stating majority opinion
contains “troublesome language”).
56. See id. at 51 (describing purchase of Brunos’ home).
57. See id. (describing attempts by Brunos to notify defendant insurance car-
rier of mold discovery).  The Brunos’ homeowners’ insurance policy specifically
addressed the issue of mold and included a rider that required Erie Insurance to
compensate the Brunos for up to $5,000 in the event mold was found. See id.  The
policy held that Erie was required to compensate the Brunos for the “direct physi-
cal loss” resulting from the mold, any additional expenses suffered by the Brunos
due to the mold’s impact on their living situation, air testing to confirm the pres-
ence of mold, and the cost of mold removal. See id.
58. See id. at 51–52 (referring to plaintiff’s complaint).  Erie sent an engineer
from a third-party source to inspect the Brunos’ home. See id. at 51.  In addition to
erroneously advising Mr. Bruno that he could continue renovating his home and
that the mold did not need to be removed, the adjuster refused to pay the requisite
amount stipulated under the insurance policy. See id.  Continuing his renovations,
Mr. Bruno discovered additional mold in his home and consequently informed
12
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prompted the Brunos to pay for the mold to be tested out-of-pocket.59
The testing revealed the mold was toxic and dangerous to human
health.60
The Brunos then demanded $5,000 from Erie in January of 2008 to
remove the mold, though Erie initially withheld payment, the company
eventually compensated the Brunos pursuant to their homeowners’ insur-
ance policy in April of 2008.61  Mrs. Bruno was later diagnosed with throat
and esophageal cancer linked to the mold, and the Brunos later vacated
and demolished their home after discovering the mold could not be
removed.62
In 2010, the Brunos filed a twelve-count complaint against Erie, the
engineer Erie initially sent to the home to investigate the mold, and the
couple from whom the Brunos purchased the property, asserting a negli-
gence claim against Erie but not a claim for breach of contract.63  Erie and
its engineer each filed preliminary objections to the Brunos’ complaint,
and Erie argued that the Brunos’ negligence claim was barred by the gist
of the action doctrine.64
The McKean County Court of Common Pleas granted Erie’s prelimi-
nary objections, holding the gist of the action doctrine precluded the Bru-
nos from asserting their tort claim.65 The Brunos filed a direct appeal to
Erie, who sent the same engineer to investigate the new mold. See id. at 52.  While
the engineer inspected and tested the mold, he did not discuss any potential
health issues with the Brunos. See id. (“Even though the engineer performed tests
of the mold, he did not disclose those results to the Brunos, nor did he or the
adjuster apprise the Brunos of the true hazard to human health posed by the
mold . . . .”).
59. See id. (listing negative effects on Mrs. Bruno’s health including “severe
coughing, difficulty breathing and clearing her throat, and intense headaches”).
60. See id.
61. See id. (describing Brunos’ attempts to seek payment from Erie to remove
mold).
62. See id. (describing physicians’ conclusions regarding Mrs. Brunos’ cancer
while stating Bruno family subsequently left their home due to gravity of mold
situation).
63. See id. at 52–53 (referring to plaintiff’s complaint and summarizing negli-
gence claims asserted therein); id. at 52 n.3 (“The Brunos did not plead a breach
of contract claim against Erie.”).  While the Brunos asserted multiple negligence
claims against Erie, the court consolidated these claims when it discussed their
viability under the gist of the action doctrine. See id. at 53 (“We will, hereinafter,
refer to these allegations collectively as the Brunos’ ‘negligence claim.’”).
64. See id. (“Both Erie and Rudick filed preliminary objections in the nature
of a demurrer.  The basis of Erie’s demurrer was that the Brunos’ negligence claim
against it was barred by the ‘gist of the action’ doctrine . . . .”).
65. See Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., No. 1369 C.D. 2009, 2011 WL 9162714, at *48
(C.P. McKean May 24) (dismissing Brunos’ negligence claim under gist of the ac-
tion doctrine), amended, 2011 WL 9162727 (C.P. McKean June 27, 2011), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 55 A.3d 131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012), rev’d, 106 A.3d 48 (Pa.
2014).
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the superior court.66  Declining to issue a written opinion, the superior
court affirmed the holding of the court of common pleas and precluded
the Brunos from asserting their negligence claim against Erie.67  The Bru-
nos subsequently filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and
the court granted the appeal.68
B. Interior Design: The Supreme Court Looks to the Superior Court and Adopts
a Duty-Based Inquiry in Bruno
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sought to determine
whether the Brunos’ negligence claim against Erie was barred by the gist
of the action doctrine.69  The court concluded that the doctrine did not
bar the Brunos’ negligence claim because Erie owed the Brunos a duty of
66. See Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 55 A.3d 131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (noting ap-
peal from McKean County Court of Common Pleas).  The Brunos cited multiple
superior court opinions to demonstrate that Erie owed them an extra-contractual
duty of care, claiming Pennsylvania has consistently recognized tort claims when a
duty exists independently of a contract. See Appellants’ Brief at 20, Bruno v. Erie
Ins. Co., 55 A.3d 131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (No. 1154 WDA 2011), 2012 WL
2165617, at *20 (citing Mirizio v. Joseph, 4 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010)).
This is not a cause of action in which the Insureds are asserting a contract
claim dressed up in tort clothing.  Rather, it is essentially a malpractice
case, whereby having undertaken to investigate the mold infestation at
the Brunos’ home, the Insurer negligently failed to conduct a proper in-
vestigation and affirmatively misled and failed to apprise them of the dan-
gers they were being exposed to.
Id. at *16.
The Brunos specifically argued that, by carrying out the inspection of their
home, Erie undertook a duty of care outside the scope of the policy and breached
that duty by failing to address the home’s mold problem and warn the Brunos of
the accompanying health risks. See id. at *22 (reiterating characterization of claim
as  “malpractice action against Erie”).  Conversely, Erie urged the superior court to
recognize that any duty owed to the Brunos stemmed from the homeowners’ insur-
ance policy, and any tort claim asserted by the Brunos was impermissible under the
doctrine. See Brief for Appellee Erie Insurance Exchange at 19, Bruno v. Erie Ins.
Co., 55 A.3d 131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (No. 1154 WDA 2011), 2012 WL 2165618, at
*19 (“The trial court properly prohibited the Brunos from recasting a breach of
contract claim as a tort claim merely by alleging that the Erie adjuster and/or the
representative from Rudick was/were negligent during performance of duties
under the insurance contract.”).
67. See Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 55 A.3d 131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (table deci-
sion) (affirming holding of trial court), rev’d, 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).
68. See Bruno, 106 A.3d at 50.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also looked at
whether the Brunos needed a certificate of merit to bring a claim against the engi-
neer hired by Erie to inspect their home.  This issue is unrelated to the analysis of
the gist of the action doctrine that this Note examines. See id. at 75.  For a further
discussion of certificates of merit and their relevance to Bruno, see Jerrold P. An-
ders & Michael W. Jervis, Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Ruling on Certificates of Merit
and “Gist of Action” May Make It More Difficult for an Architect or Engineer to Seek an
Early Dismissal, CONSTRUCTION & SURETY ALERT (White & Williams, Phila., Pa.),
Dec. 30, 2014, available at http://www.whiteandwilliams.com/pp/alert-1327.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7BMC-SLKW].
69. See Bruno, 106 A.3d at 55.
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a care as a matter of social policy.70  As such, the court reversed the order
of the superior court dismissing the Brunos’ claim.71  Importantly, the jus-
tices held that a duty-based inquiry governs the analysis for applying the
gist of the action doctrine.72  Nonetheless, the court’s analysis of Erie’s
social duty to the Brunos did not set forth a specific standard for determin-
ing the viability of a tort claim under this duty-based approach.73  The
concurring justice agreed with the majority’s holding with respect to the
Brunos’ negligence claim, but maintained that the court’s interpretation
of the gist of the action doctrine was impermissibly broad and deviated
from the governing superior court analysis.74
1. Going for the Duty-Based Look: The Majority Relies on the Superior Court
and Holds That the Plaintiffs’ Negligence Claim Is Not Barred by the
Gist of the Action Doctrine
Bruno gave the Pennsylvania Supreme Court an opportunity to affirm
the lower Pennsylvania courts’ belief that it would formally adopt the gist
of the action doctrine.75  Consistent with the lower courts’ analysis, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged the doctrine as a fundamental
concept in Pennsylvania common law.76  To that end, the court concluded
that the gist of the action doctrine did not preclude the Brunos from
bringing their negligence claim against Erie.77
The court began its analysis by noting that its discussion of the gist of
the action doctrine had been specifically limited, but that it addressed is-
sues “in which the distinction between the underlying action being a tort
or contract claim was dispositive.”78  With this distinction in mind, the
court harkened back to its decisions in Zell and McCahan.79  The court
70. See id. at 71 (concluding substance of Brunos’ allegations concerned al-
leged breach of socially imposed duty outside scope of parties’ contract).
71. See id. at 71 (“We, therefore, reverse the order of the Superior Court af-
firming the trial court’s dismissal of the Brunos’ negligence claim on the basis of
its application of the gist of the action doctrine.”).
72. See id. at 69 (describing duty-based approach as applicable standard in
regard to gist of the action doctrine).
73. See id. (concluding Brunos’ claims articulated alleged breach of general
social duty by Erie).
74. See id. at 76 (Eakin, J., concurring) (criticizing majority’s interpretation of
existing case law on gist of action doctrine).
75. See id. at 56 (majority opinion) (referring to previous Third Circuit and
superior court decisions that predicted gist of action doctrine was ready for review
by Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
76. See id. at 68 (stating previous decisions of court demonstrate that gist of
action doctrine and its underlying tenets “have long been an integral part of our
Court’s jurisprudence”).
77. See id. at 71 (reversing lower court’s dismissal of Brunos’ claim due to gist
of the action doctrine).
78. See id. at 60 (stating Pennsylvania Supreme Court has contemplated differ-
ences between tort and contract claims).
79. See id. at 63 (referring to Zell for proposition that “gist” of claim stems
from duty allegedly breached and discussing McCahan to show court’s previous
15
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explained that these decisions demonstrated Pennsylvania’s recognition of
tort claims between parties in privity of contract if the duty allegedly
breached was not contractual in nature.80  The court noted its previous
consistency in distinguishing contractual from extra-contractual duties, as
well as the superior court’s duty-based approach to evaluating tort claims,
but the court also recognized its silence in regard to the gist of the action
doctrine after the 1960s and thus turned to the superior court to decide
the fate of the Brunos’ negligence claim.81
The court began its examination of the superior court’s approach by
reviewing Bash.82  Acknowledging Bash as a “leading case” on the gist of
the action doctrine, the majority invoked its characterization of contract
and tort claims based on their respective duties.83  The court then recog-
nized eToll as a subsequent decision that “seemingly added an extra con-
sideration to the Bash analysis” by considering whether a tort claim is
“inextricably intertwined” with the parties’ contract.84  The majority went
acknowledgment of nonfeasance–misfeasance distinction when determining duty
at basis of tort claim).  While the Bruno court stated that the difference between a
nonfeasance and misfeasance contributed to the history of the gist of the action
doctrine, the nonfeasance–misfeasance distinction is beyond the scope of this
Note. See id. at 63 (describing contribution of nonfeasance and misfeasance to
history of gist of the action doctrine).  For a general discussion of this concept
within tort law, see Jean Elting Rowe & Theodore Silver, The Jurisprudence of Action
and Inaction in the Law of Tort: Solving the Puzzle of Nonfeasance and Misfeasance from
the Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Centuries, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 807, 809–27 (1995).
80. See Bruno, 106 A.3d at 63 (discussing court’s recognition of tort claims
among parties to contracts in Zell and McCahan).  The Bruno court highlighted the
distinction drawn between the breach of a contractual duty and the negligent un-
dertaking of a contractual duty in McCahan, which warrants an action in tort. See
id. (“[W]hereas, if the allegations substantially concern the defendant’s negligent
breach of a duty which exists independently and regardless of the contract—a mis-
feasance—then the action will be regarded as one in tort.”).
81. See id. at 66 (noting prevalence of gist of action doctrine within superior
court).
82. See id. (stating superior court took duty-based approach similar to that
used in previous supreme court decision Bash v. Bell Telephone Co., 601 A.2d 825
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
83. See id. at 65 (acknowledging holding of Bash).  The Bruno court looked to
Bash as authoritative in respect to determining whether a plaintiff’s claim sounded
in tort or contract. See id. (stating Bash court concluded parties’ duties were con-
tractual and plaintiff’s claim was barred under gist of the action doctrine).
84. See id. (stating eToll offered additional inquiry to Bash analysis by introduc-
ing “inextricably intertwined” standard (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The
court described eToll as providing an additional inquiry following Bash to examine
the proximity of the tort claim to the parties’ contract. See id. at 67 (listing situa-
tions identified in eToll in which courts found the gist of the action doctrine barred
a putative tort claim, including “(1) where the tort claim ‘aris[es] solely from a
contract between the parties’; (2) where ‘the duties allegedly breached were cre-
ated and grounded in the contract itself’; (3) where ‘the liability stems from a
contract’; or (4) where the tort claim ‘essentially duplicates a breach of contract
claim or the success of which is wholly dependent on the terms of a contract.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Adver. Inc., 811 A.2d
10, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002))).  In stressing the importance of eToll as a framework
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on to conclude that subsequent superior court decisions invoked the Bash
duty-based analysis, despite some variance within the Pennsylvania courts
on the appropriate inquiry.85
After reviewing the prevalence of both Bash and eToll within the lower
courts, the majority concluded that Pennsylvania courts have “consistently”
evaluated the duty underlying a given plaintiff’s tort claim.86  Despite
characterizing eToll as an elaboration on the inquiry set forth in Bash, the
court declared that eToll and Bash could be reconciled and that Bash rep-
resented the appropriate governing analysis.87  By holding a duty-based
demarcation was the appropriate framework, the court formally acknowl-
edged the gist of the action doctrine after decades of unofficial recogni-
tion by the lower courts and approved a duty-based framework for its
application.88
Turning to the Brunos’ negligence claim, the court framed the issue
as whether Erie breached a contractual duty set forth in the Brunos’
homeowners’ insurance policy, or rather breached “an independent social
duty imposed by the law of torts.”89  After reviewing Erie’s obligations
under the policy, the court found that the Brunos’ negligence claim was
premised on accusations that Erie and its third-party agents acted negli-
gently while carrying out their duties under the policy and that the allega-
tions therefore concerned the breach of a social duty outside the scope of
for analyzing tort claims, the court added that other courts viewed eToll as the
governing analysis on this issue. See id. at 67 n.14 (stating Third Circuit courts
consider eToll controlling precedent on gist of action doctrine in Pennsylvania).
85. See id. (describing superior court decisions after Bash that also employ
duty-based inquiry).  The court also noted the lack of uniformity within Penn-
sylvania over the appropriate framework for applying the gist of the action doc-
trine, stating that the commonwealth court does not follow Bash but rather an
analysis similar to the nonfeasance–misfeasance distinction used in McCahan. See
id.
86. See id. at 68 (discussing synthesis of case law dealing with gist of action
doctrine).  The court found that, given the case law analyzing the gist of the action
doctrine in Pennsylvania, the origin of the duty allegedly breached is the “critical
determinative factor in determining whether the claim is truly one in tort, or for
breach of contract.” See id.
87. See id. at 69 n.17.
With respect to the Superior Court’s eToll decision, we note that . . . its
consideration of whether tort and contract claims brought together in
the same action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ should be viewed in this
context, i.e., as a determination of whether the nature of the duty upon
which the breach of contract claims rest is the same as that which forms
the basis of the tort claims.
Id.
88. See id. at 69 (“Although this duty-based demarcation was first recognized
by our Court over a century and a half ago, it remains sound, as evidenced by the
fact that it is currently employed by the high Courts of the majority of our sister
jurisdictions to differentiate between tort and contract actions.  We, therefore, re-
affirm its applicability as the touchstone standard for ascertaining the true gist or
gravamen of a claim pled by a plaintiff in a civil complaint.” (footnote omitted)).
89. See id. at 70 (stating intent of applying relevant gist of action precedent to
case at bar).
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the contract.90  The court evaluated these contractual duties with respect
to the Brunos’ complaint and concluded that the Brunos’ tort claim was
not based on obligations imposed by their homeowners’ insurance
policy.91
The court found the basis for the Brunos’ claim was the allegation
that Erie was negligent while inspecting the mold in the Brunos’ home,
one of Erie’s contractual duties imposed by the homeowner’s insurance
policy.92  By looking to the allegations set forth in the complaint, the court
emphasized that the Brunos alleged Erie was negligent for incorrectly de-
termining that the mold was not a health hazard and advising the Brunos
to continue the renovations on their home.93  The court reiterated its fo-
cus on the “social duty,” rather than a contractual duty, that formed the
basis for the Brunos’ claim.94  The court also reiterated its intent to em-
ploy a duty-based analysis by finding the Brunos’ homeowners’ insurance
policy acted as a “vehicle” for the relationship between the parties, “during
the existence of which Erie allegedly committed a tort.”95  The court then
reversed the superior court’s decision to affirm the trial court’s dismissal
of the negligence claim and remanded the case to the superior court.96
2. Design Differences: Justice Eakin’s Concurrence Disagrees with Majority’s
Analysis of Gist of the Action Doctrine
Bruno additionally produced a concurring opinion that exposed the
flaws in the majority’s application of the gist of the action doctrine.97  In
his concurrence, Justice Eakin agreed with the majority’s conclusion that
90. See id. (“The Brunos’ claim against Erie for its alleged actions at issue in
this appeal, quite simply, is not based on Erie’s violation of any of these contractual
commitments.”).
91. See id. at 70–71 (discussing substance of Brunos’ negligence claim).
92. See id. at 70 (reasoning Brunos’ claim was “predicated on [ ] allegedly
negligent actions” taken by Erie in fulfilling contractual duties pursuant to home-
owners’ insurance policy).
93. See id. (referring to plaintiffs’ complaint).  The court further recounted
the details of the Brunos’ negligence allegation, acknowledging that the Brunos
claimed they proceeded with the renovations on their home and experienced seri-
ous health issues as a result of Erie’s inspection and advice. See id. at 71 (“The
Brunos further aver that, because of this advice and recommendation, they pro-
ceeded with the removal of the basement paneling, which later led to them suffer-
ing health problems from the mold exposure, and their entire house being
rendered uninhabitable such that it had to be destroyed.”).
94. See id. (concluding allegations were grounded in alleged breach of social
duty).
95. See id. (describing insurance policy as vehicle for establishing relationship
between Brunos and Erie).
96. See id. (“We, therefore, reverse the order of the Superior Court affirming
the trial court’s dismissal of the Brunos’ negligence claim on the basis of its appli-
cation of the gist of the action doctrine.”).  Because the trial court dismissed the
Brunos’ claim, the supreme court remanded the case to the superior court to allow
consideration of other matters previously not discussed in the Brunos’ case. See id.
97. See id. at 75–76 (Eakin, J., concurring).
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the Brunos’ claim was not barred under the gist of the action doctrine.98
However, Justice Eakin departed from the majority in regard to its inter-
pretation of the doctrine and sought to draw awareness to “troublesome
language” in the majority’s opinion.99  Justice Eakin then called into ques-
tion the majority’s interpretation of eToll, arguing that the majority
“painted with a broad brush,” resulting in an overly broad holding.100
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: BRUNO DEMONSTRATES “PAINTING WITH A BROAD
BRUSH” AND PUTS FORTH ANALYSIS THAT WILL FURTHER
COMPLICATE THE GIST OF THE ACTION DOCTRINE
Justice Eakin’s concurring opinion draws much-needed attention to
the breadth of the majority’s holding.101  In criticizing the majority’s con-
clusion that a tort claim is permitted when the alleged breach is not
grounded in the defendant’s contractual duties, Justice Eakin alluded to
two critical aspects of Bruno: the majority’s failure to provide a clear articu-
lation of the appropriate standard for applying the gist of the action doc-
trine and the breadth of its holding.102  With Justice Eakin’s comments in
mind, one must acknowledge these aspects of Bruno and the potential
ramifications of what Justice Eakin referred to as a “broad
pronouncement.”103
Rather than using its position as Pennsylvania’s highest court to clar-
ify the gist of the action doctrine, the Bruno court added extra ambiguity
to this longstanding common law doctrine by holding that a tort claim
may survive scrutiny under the gist of the action doctrine if the claim
arises from a general social duty.104  The court’s interpretation of the gist
of the action doctrine in Bruno is problematic for two reasons: (1) the
98. See id. at 75 (stating agreement with decision of majority regarding plain-
tiffs’ negligence claim under gist of the action doctrine).
99. See id. (“[B]ut I write separately to caution against what I deem trouble-
some language.”).  Addressing the breadth of the majority’s holding, Justice Eakin
stated that the majority’s reasoning appeared to “paint with a broad brush” by
allowing negligence claims where the duty allegedly breached did not arise from
the parties’ contractual obligations. See id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (“To the extent that the majority is perceived to ‘paint with a broad brush,’
suggesting any negligence claim based on a contracting party’s manner of per-
formance does not arise from the underlying contract, I must disagree.” (citation
omitted)).
100. See id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted) (criticizing majority’s
analysis of precedent construing gist of the action doctrine).  Justice Eakin argued
the court’s interpretation of eToll was overly broad because it contradicted the
holding of the decision, which he called an “inherently circumstantial analysis.”
See id
101. See id. (discussing departure from majority in respect to breadth of
holding).
102. See id. (recounting conclusion of majority).
103. See id. (criticizing majority’s holding).  For a further discussion of the
potential consequences of Bruno, see infra notes 125–34 and accompanying text.
104. For a further discussion of the ambiguity in Bruno, see infra notes 107–32
and accompanying text.
19
Anthony: Home is Where the Confusion Is: Pennsylvania Formally Adopts the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
254 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 235
majority failed to explain its analysis for determining the presence of a
“social duty”; and (2) the majority did not specify a category of defendants
to which its holding potentially applies.105  Thus, the court issued an am-
biguous opinion that provides little guidance to lower courts for interpret-
ing the gist of the action doctrine.106
A. The Majority Does Not Provide an Analysis for Determining Whether There
Is a Social Duty Owed to a Party
In concluding that the Brunos’ negligence claim was not barred
under the gist of the action doctrine, the court reasoned that the duty
allegedly breached by Erie was not accounted for by the Brunos’ home-
owners’ insurance policy.107  Instead, the court concluded that Erie
breached a social duty owed to the Brunos, independent of the terms of
the insurance policy.108  However, the court failed to explain which social
duties would allow a tort claim to survive scrutiny under the gist of the
action doctrine.109
The Bruno court claimed to follow the superior court in its analysis of
the duty allegedly breached.110  In both Bash and eToll, the superior court
explained why the duties allegedly breached were either social or contrac-
tual in nature and articulated a basis for determining whether a relation-
ship existed between the parties that extended beyond their contractual
relationship.111  Although the majority discussed the homeowners’ insur-
105. For a further critique of the Bruno court’s analysis, see infra notes 107–32
and accompanying text.
106. For a further discussion of the breadth of the holding in Bruno, see infra
notes 133–39 and accompanying text.
107. See Bruno, 106 A.3d at 71 (describing source of Erie’s obligations to
Brunos).
108. See id. at 70–71 (stating Brunos’ negligence claim was based in social duty
and not contractual obligations under homeowners’ insurance policy).
109. See id. at 70 (stating alleged breach of social duty was source of Brunos’
tort claim against Erie).  In discussing the Brunos’ negligence claim against Erie,
the court distinguished between Erie’s duties as set forth in the insurance policy
and those stemming from a “general social duty,” yet the court did not articulate
an approach for determining whether such a duty exists. See id. (“Consequently,
these allegations of negligence facially concern Erie’s alleged breach of a general
social duty, not a breach of any duty created by the insurance policy itself.”).
110. See id. at 66–67 (noting key role played by superior court in developing
jurisprudence on gist of action doctrine).
111. See Bash v. Bell Tel. Co., 601 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating
defendant’s obligations were contractual because defendant did not provide what
is considered to be a public service), superseded by PA. R. APP. P. 341, as stated in
Keefer v. Keefer, 741 A.2d 808 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).  In Bash, the superior court
held that the defendant’s duties were contractual because they stemmed from an
agreement under which the defendant would print advertisements in a telephone
book in exchange for payment by the plaintiff. See Bash, 601 A.2d at 826 (describ-
ing factual scenario giving rise to suit between contracting parties); see also eToll,
Inc. v. Elias/Savion Adver. Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (stating
existence of extra-contractual duties depends on presence of unique fiduciary rela-
tionship).  In eToll, the court found that the existence of the allegedly breached
20
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ance policy as a source of contractual duties in Bruno, the court did not
identify a specific reason or set of factors that led to its conclusion that
Erie owed the Brunos an extra-contractual social duty.112  Furthermore,
the majority did not provide a method for determining the presence of a
social duty for lower courts to use when applying the doctrine.113  Despite
its goal of eliminating ambiguity in the doctrine’s application that plagued
the lower courts for decades, the majority left open the issue of deciding
the presence of a social duty and therefore missed its chance to provide
Pennsylvania courts with a clearer test for applying the doctrine.114
B. The Majority Does Not Specify a Category of Defendants
to Whom Its Holding Applies
Furthermore, provided that the requisite social duty is present, the
Bruno court did not identify a specific class of defendants against which a
tort claim is permitted.115  While the majority discussed the duty of care
owed to the public by “common carriers” in its historical overview of the
doctrine, it did not ask whether Erie fell within a specified category of
potential defendants.116  The court further deviated from the prevailing
duty stemmed from a fiduciary relationship between the parties, and the plaintiff’s
tort claim was therefore barred because the facts did not indicate such a relation-
ship existed between the plaintiff and defendant, who agreed to provide advertis-
ing services to the plaintiff. Id. at 22–23 (“Most commercial contracts for
professional services involve one party relying on the other party’s superior skill or
expertise in providing that particular service.”).  Further, the court found that any
evidence that the defendant possessed knowledge superior to that of the plaintiff
was not sufficient to warrant a fiduciary duty. See id. at 24 (stating there was “no
evidence” that parties’ relationship was not so “markedly imbalanced” so as to im-
pose fiduciary relationship).
112. See Bruno, 106 A.3d at 71 (stating only that Brunos’ allegations “facially
concern Erie’s alleged breach of a general social duty”).
113. See id. (finding allegation of breach of social duty).  The Bruno majority
did not discuss how lower courts should go about determining whether a plaintiff
alleges a breach of a social duty; after finding that the Brunos did not allege a
breach of contract, the court quickly moved to its order that the superior court’s
decision on this issue be reversed. See id.
114. See id. (restricting discussion of extra-contractual duty on part of Erie to
statement that negligence claim was based on alleged breach of “general social
duty”).
115. See id. (omitting reference to Erie’s status as homeowners’ insurance car-
rier).  The court discussed the relevance of the Brunos’ insurance policy, but did
not state that Erie owed the Brunos a duty of care as a matter of social policy
because Erie is a homeowner’s insurance provider. See id.  Furthermore, the ma-
jority’s analysis omitted any discussion of whether a defendant’s identity should be
taken into account when applying the gist of the action doctrine. See id. (allowing
plaintiffs to proceed with tort claim based solely on duty-based interpretation of
gist of the action doctrine).
116. See id. at 65 (discussing previous acknowledgment of common carriers in
Pennsylvania for deciding whether to permit tort claim).  The Bruno court explic-
itly acknowledged that the identity of the defendant played a role in past Penn-
sylvania decisions deciding whether to permit certain tort claims between parties
in privity of contract. See id. (“We specifically contrasted this limited duty created
21
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superior court decisions in this respect, as both Bash and eToll included
analyses of the respective defendants’ identities in relation to whether tort
claims were permissible.117  Given the superior court decisions that
shaped the reasoning in Bruno, the majority’s failure to restrict its holding
to a specific category of defendants demonstrates a questionable applica-
tion of the gist of the action doctrine.118  In Bash, the type of defendant
involved helped determine the permissibility of the plaintiff’s tort
claim.119  The Bash court stated that since the defendant did not provide a
public service, the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was based on a
breach of a contractual duty and therefore barred under the gist of the
action doctrine.120  Such scrutiny of the defendant also appeared in eToll,
where the superior court discussed the defendant’s status as an advertising
agency in determining whether the claim was contractual or social in na-
ture.121  Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s own precedent
considered the identity or occupation of the defendant when analyzing a
plaintiff’s tort claim.122
by the parties’ contractual relationship with the general duty of service owed by a
common carrier, such as a railroad or bus company, to the public, which duty is
implied by law by reason of the relation of the parties.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
117. See Bash v. Bell Tel. Co., 601 A.2d 825, 830–31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(discussing imposition of social duties on defendants providing public services),
superseded by PA. R. APP. P. 341, as stated in Keefer v. Keefer, 741 A.2d 808 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1999); see also eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advert., Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 22
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (stating mere existence of commercial contract between par-
ties not sufficient to create special relationship giving rise to duty of care on part of
defendant).
118. For a further discussion of the Bruno majority’s deviation from the supe-
rior court in respect to consideration of the defendant when applying the gist of
the action doctrine, see infra notes 123–32 and accompanying text.
119. See Bash, 601 A.2d at 829 (describing defendant as provider of advertis-
ing services).
120. See id. at 829–30 (citing Behrend v. Bell Tel. Co., 363 A.2d 1152, 1167
n.16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976)) (distinguishing telephone advertising company from
party providing “necessary services”).  The Bash court specifically stated that the
defendant’s obligations were contractual because its agreement to provide adver-
tising services for the plaintiff was not public and it was therefore not a provider of
a public service. See id. (referring to previous decisions holding that Yellow Pages
advertisements constituted private service).
121. See eToll, 811 A.2d at 22 (finding defendant “cannot be held to the stan-
dards of an agent” and therefore no fiduciary relationship existed so as to permit
tort claim).  To determine whether a fiduciary relationship was present, the eToll
court inquired as to whether the defendant had authority to act on matters of
“trust and confidence” that created a special trust between the plaintiff and defen-
dant, so as to place the defendant in a superior position to exercise undue influ-
ence over the plaintiff. See id. at 13, 22 (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that defendant
was “‘trusted advisor’ with specialized expertise, skill and experience in the field of
marketing”).
122. See Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 243 A.2d 395, 398 (Pa. 1968) (stating defen-
dant-landlord owed broader social duty because landlords have inherently greater
bargaining power than tenants); Horney v. Nixon, 61 A. 1088, 1089 (Pa. 1905)
(distinguishing movie theater operator from common carrier in analyzing whether
22
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C. Bruno Invites Ambiguity and Hands over the Key to Litigants
in Regard to the Gist of the Action Doctrine
The gist of the action doctrine is intended to limit certain tort
claims.123  However, the Bruno holding may cause litigants to argue that
their tort claims are not barred by the doctrine under the decision’s duty-
based inquiry.124  Conversely, Bruno serves as a reference point from
duty allegedly breached was contractual).  Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has considered the type of defendant when evaluating tort liability in
other instances. See, e.g., Thierfelder v. Wolfert, 52 A.3d 1251, 1253 (Pa. 2012)
(examining whether medical general practitioner owes same duty of care as pro-
vider of mental health services and is therefore liable due to sexual relationship
with patient).  Moreover, the court has noted that, while the legal concept of duty
is complex, a consideration of the actor accused of negligence may factor into this
consideration. See, e.g., Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166, 1169 (Pa.
2000) (stating examination of duty “involves the weighing of several discrete fac-
tors” including social value of service provided by actor and public ramifications of
finding duty).
123. See Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Limit Those Claims:
Applying the Gist of the Action Doctrine to Remove Negligence, Fraud, Common Law Contri-
bution and Indemnification Claims, MARTINDALE (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.martin-
dale.com/insurance/article_Marshall-Dennehey-Warner-Coleman-Goggin_616038
.htm [https://perma.cc/7PKH-4G84] (stating that purpose of gist of action doc-
trine is to limit tort claims to preserve contract-tort distinction); see also Gist of the
Action Doctrine Used to Defeat Tort Claims in Construction Defect Case, BENNETT, BRICK-
LIN & SALTZBURG (Winter 2008), http://www.bbs-law.com/winter-2008-edition/
[https://perma.cc/TS4D-8GSH] (“The gist-of-the-action and economic-loss doc-
trines have increasingly been used by defendants in an attempt to defeat tort
claims arising out of alleged construction defects.”); Jennifer M. Horn, Gist of the
Action Doctrine Gains Traction in Pennsylvania, CONSTRUCTION L. SIGNAL (Aug. 10,
2012), http://www.constructionlawsignal.com/by-state/pennsylvania/gist-of-the-
action-doctrine-gains-traction-in-pennsylvania/ [https://perma.cc/LCD3-FS8U]
(stating that gist of the action doctrine “typically precludes plaintiffs from pursuing
tort actions where the underlying ‘gist’ of the action is the breach of contractual
duties”).  Additionally, Bruno has sparked concern that Pennsylvania courts may
now interpret the definition of contractual duties more narrowly and therefore hin-
der the limiting effect of the gist of the action doctrine. See Walthew et al., supra
note 54, at 2 (describing potential impact of Bruno on ability for courts to differen-
tiate between tort and contracts).  Justice Eakin’s critique of the majority’s holding
has also been cited in discussions of Bruno’s effect on the ultimate purpose of the
gist of the action doctrine. See, e.g., id. (acknowledging Justice Eakin’s description
of majority opinion as including “troublesome language”); Jason Yarbrough,
‘Bruno’ Brings Broad Changes to Construction Law, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 11,
2015), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202734098970/Bruno-Brings-
Broad-Changes-to-Construction-Law [https://perma.cc/K2NT-R98B] (describing
Bruno as “significant interpretation of [the gist of action] doctrine that provides
additional considerations for a trial court and expands the circumstances under
which a breach of contract claim and tort claim can coexist”).
124. See, e.g., Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Further
Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Unfair Competition Claim at 3,
Sko¨ld v. Galderma Labs., L.P., No. 14-CV-05280-TJS, 2015 WL 2092016 (“In Bruno,
the duty to refrain from acting negligently existed separately from the contractual
duty to inspect and remove the toxic mold.”); see also Plaintiff, Piotr Nowak’s Mem-
orandum of Law in Opposition to Major League Soccer, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss
at 10, Nowak v. Major League Soccer, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-03503, 2015 WL 4386818
(citing Bruno for proposition that allegations of breach of social duty are not
23
Anthony: Home is Where the Confusion Is: Pennsylvania Formally Adopts the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
258 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 235
which defendants may argue that the duties they are accused of breaching
are inherently contractual and not social.125  The Bruno court’s inability to
articulate a clear standard for applying the gist of the action doctrine will
create additional ambiguity in the lower courts, as both defendants and
plaintiffs may seek to use the broad duty-based approach to their bene-
fit.126  Such ambiguity demonstrates that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
missed an opportunity in Bruno to clarify the longstanding doctrinal con-
fusion surrounding the gist of the action doctrine within the state.127
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Bruno can be seen in discussions of the gist of
the action doctrine at the trial-court level.128  The impact of Bruno on
lower courts has simultaneously proved worrisome for defendants seeking
to assert the gist of the action doctrine as a defense to various tort
claims.129  However, the true impact of Bruno is the decision’s ultimate
barred by gist of action doctrine and stating duty allegedly breached was not con-
tractual in nature and should therefore survive defendant’s motion to dismiss).
125. See, e.g., Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 9, Husaini v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., No. 2:14-
cv-00636-DSC, 2015 WL 2198217 (likening plaintiff’s claims to negligence claim
made in Bruno and arguing that plaintiff’s claims are grounded in parties’ contract
and therefore barred under the gist of action doctrine as articulated in Bruno);
Memorandum at 41–42, Lightstyles, Ltd. v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., No. 1:13-
CV-1510, 2015 WL 5253462 (citing Bruno for proposition that nature of duty alleg-
edly breached is key factor in applying gist of the action doctrine and arguing
plaintiff’s claim is barred under gist of the action doctrine because plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim arises from same conduct giving rise to tortious interfer-
ence claim).
126. See Walthew et al., supra note 54, at 1, 2 (stating that “Bruno does not
upset the standard that has long been applied” and defendants still “have the gist
of the action doctrine in their quiver” despite flexibility given to plaintiffs by Bruno
holding); see also Betts Law Office, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Decides Bruno v. Erie
Insurance and Provides Guidance—but Not Clarity—Regarding the “Gist of the Action”
Doctrine, PITT. BUS. LITIG. LAW. BLOG (Dec. 27, 2014), http://www.pittsburghbusi-
nesslitigationlawyerblog.com/2014/12/27/pennsylvania-supreme-court-decides-
bruno-v-erie-insurance-provides-guidance-clarity-regarding-gist-action-doctrine/
[https://perma.cc/8JGE-WM8Q] (“The decision does not provide any bright-line
tests for application of the doctrine and the circumstances under which con-
tracting parties may assert tort claims against each other will continue to be actively
litigated in Pennsylvania courts in the wake of Bruno.”).
127. See supra note 50 (describing Bruno as opportunity for Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court to resolve gist of action doctrine).
128. For a further discussion of the impact of Bruno at the trial-court level, see
infra notes 133–39 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Anders & Jervis, supra note 68, at *2 (“Nevertheless, defendants
should take note that a plaintiff’s tort and contract claims may be considered sepa-
rately even if the alleged tortious conduct took place in the context of perform-
ance of a contract.”).  Concern over the potential impact of Bruno is visible in
client advisories that followed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision. See, e.g.,
J. Benjamin Nevius, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules Favorably for Plaintiff in Bruno
v. Erie Insurance, IN ZONE (Fox Rothschild LLP, Phila., Pa.), Jan. 2015, at 5, 5,
available at http://www.foxrothschild.com/content/uploads/2015/05/In-the-
Zone-January-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AHX-ECF9] (stating that Bruno cre-
ates “pro-plaintiff course” in litigation by permitting tort claims alongside contract
claims); id. (“Contracting parties should be aware that their actions and conduct in
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effect of eroding the doctrine.130  Because of its broad duty-based ap-
proach, the ultimate outcome of Bruno is that if a court concludes the
defendant did not breach a “social duty,” the gist of the action doctrine
does not apply.131 Bruno thus contradicts the doctrine’s intent by granting
broad deference to potential tort claims despite the doctrine’s historically
underlying concern: to preserve the contract–tort distinction.132
V. CONCLUSION
Because Bruno binds lower Pennsylvania courts to a broader, duty-
based approach for applying the gist of the action doctrine, both plaintiffs
and defendants may benefit from the ambiguity embedded in its hold-
ing.133  Further, the breadth of the holding in Bruno may allow for more
tort claims to survive application of the doctrine during the preliminary
stages of litigation.134  Because the available remedies vary greatly between
actions for breach of contract and tort claims, an increased number of tort
actions will likely alter the outcome of civil litigation in Pennsylvania’s
lower courts.135
the performance of an agreement may be subjected to heightened scrutiny in the
future and may expose them to additional damages other than those set forth in
the agreement.”).
130. See Christopher E. Ballod, Parting Is Such Sweet Sorrow: Pennsylvania Bids
Farewell to the Gist of the Action Doctrine, and Further Opens the Door to Insurance Cover-
age for Construction Losses, CONSTRUCTION LEGAL EDGE (Pietragallo, Gordon, Alfano,
Bosick & Raspanti, LLP, Phila., Pa.), Summer 2015, at 1, 1, available at http://www
.pietragallo.com/library/files/sum-
mer_2015_edition_of_the_construction_legal_edge.pdf [https://perma.cc/244C-
4NKW] (stating Bruno “significantly narrows the venerable gist of the action doc-
trine and signals permission by the courts to allow plaintiffs to pursue claims the
parties never considered when negotiating their contract”).
131. For a further discussion of the holding of Bruno and the significance of
its duty-based analysis, see infra notes 133–39 and accompanying text.
132. See Reardon v. Allegheny Coll., 926 A.2d 477, 486 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
(quoting Glazer v. Chandler, 200 A.2d 416, 418 (Pa. 1964)) (discussing policy con-
cerns regarding contract–tort distinction in support of applying gist of the action
doctrine). But see Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48, 71 (Pa. 2014) (permitting
Brunos’ tort claim upon finding that negligence allegation stemmed from broader
social duty on part of Erie).  Justice Eakin also noted this potential problem in his
concurring opinion. See id. at 76 (Eakin, J., concurring) (“However, synthesizing
case law to stand for such a broad pronouncement does not comport with the ‘gist
of the action’ doctrine—an inherently circumstantial analysis.”).
133. See Walthew et al., supra note 54 (predicting questions surrounding
Bruno holding will appear in future litigation); see also E. McCord Clayton, Testing
the Boundaries of the Gist of the Action Defense, BAZELON, LESS & FELDMAN PC (June 18,
2015), http://www.bazless.com/site/files/goa_limits_copy3.pdf [https://perma
.cc/862W-SU78] (discussing gist of action doctrine in litigation following Bruno
and noting post-Bruno litigation has witnessed mixed results for defendants in re-
spect to applicability of gist of action doctrine).
134. See Bruno, 106 A.3d at 75 (Eakin, J., concurring) (expressing caution re-
garding breadth of majority’s holding in Bruno).
135. See Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 281 (Cal.
2004) (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (criticizing permissibility of tort claims between
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Lower courts would therefore benefit from taking measures to curb
the effect of Bruno’s ambiguity on litigation between parties who are con-
tractually bound to each other.136  One such measure would be to ex-
amine the identity of the given defendant and assess whether tort law
typically imposes a “social duty” on that category of defendant.137  Doing
so would add clarity to the gist of the action doctrine by creating a body of
case law that has confronted this issue of ambiguity while still adhering to
the holding of Bruno.138  However, given the current lack of interpretive
guidance for lower courts applying the gist of the action doctrine, Penn-
sylvania has no choice but to open the door to many potential changes in
civil litigation.139
contract parties due to fear that “every breach of contract claim can don tort
clothes”); Steven M. Richman, Focusing on Damages in Commercial Litigation, 250 N.J.
LAW. MAG. 61, 65 (2008) (describing uncertainty regarding preservation of con-
tract-tort distinction in commercial litigation damage awards).
136. For a further discussion of the potential implications of Bruno, see supra
notes 123–32 and accompanying text.
137. For a further discussion of the relevance of the defendant’s identity or
occupation in respect to the gist of the action doctrine, see supra notes 115–22 and
accompanying text.
138. For a further discussion of instances in which courts examined the de-
fendant’s identity in applying the gist of the action doctrine, see supra notes
115–22 and accompanying text.
139. See Karl S. Myers, More Tools in the Toolbox for Policyholder Plaintiffs?, DIS-
PATCH INS. NEWS (Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP, Phila., Pa.), Fall 2013, at
1, 3, available at http://www.stradley.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2014/Dis-
patch_October_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z84-LY3Z] (discussing implications
of Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision on doctrine for potential litigants and
predicting Bruno would “significantly alter the landscape of insurance policyholder
litigation in Pennsylvania”).
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